Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre will return to the House of Commons this fall after securing a seat in rural Alberta over the summer. Poilievre handily won the August 18 Battle River—Crowfoot by-election with a little over 80 percent of the vote, in line with past Conservative performances in the riding.
The by-election, however, was only the first—and easiest—step on Poilievre’s long road to political recovery. Pre-election polls last winter showed that while he remained a polarizing figure in Canadian politics, he nevertheless enjoyed overwhelming backing from Conservative voters. But after losing the 2025 general election to Mark Carney’s Liberals—along with his own long-held seat in Carleton—Poilievre may now face his harshest critics from his own side of the aisle, and from what once seemed like an unshakable base.
According to the Conservative Party constitution, a leader defeated in a general election must submit to a vote of confidence from party members in order to stay on. That vote will take place at the next Conservative national convention in January 2026, in Calgary.
What do the numbers say about Poilievre’s standing? The Angus Reid Institute (ARI) recently released post-election polling on how Canadians—and, more interestingly, Conservative voters—viewed Poilievre’s campaign and leadership prospects.
One of the themes Carney’s Liberals surfed on during the campaign was the threat posed to Canada’s economy and sovereignty coming from south of the border, and more specifically from the US President Donald Trump. Many Liberals argued that a politician running a mostly negative campaign and who “sounds like Donald Trump” couldn’t defend Canada’s interests in this conflict.
According to ARI’s numbers, this Trump-Poilievre comparison had a lot of voters nodding, including a share of Conservatives supporters. Data from the survey shows 59 percent of respondents agreed to the statement “Pierre Poilievre sounded too much like Donald Trump” during the 2025 campaign, against 35 percent who disagreed.
Yet, it’s only when we break down the results by region and demographics that we see how much this argument had traction with voters.
Regionally, majorities agreed that Poilievre sounded too much like Trump in Quebec (64 percent), Atlantic Canada (63 percent), Ontario (60 percent), and British Columbia (58 percent). Even in the Conservative strongholds of Alberta and Saskatchewan, as many respondents agreed than disagreed.
Among both men (55 percent) and women (64 percent) and across all voting age groups, most voters believe Poilievre sounded too much like the US president. This is an impression that is hard to shake off once it takes hold.
While we expect voters from non-Conservative parties to agree to the Poilievre-Trump links, ARI also found that the comparisons found echoes even among a conspicuous tranche of Conservative voters: 19 percent of CPC voters thought Poilievre sounded too much like Trump—a minority for sure, but which still represents one in five Conservatives. Hardly negligible.
Other numbers point to further dissatisfaction within the base: 29 percent of Conservatives agreed to the statement “The campaign slogan ‘Bring it Home’ didn’t make any sense,” and 27 percent of Conservatives believe the Poilievre campaign was too negative. Those may be small cracks in the foundation, but they suggest CPC voters have legitimate criticism of their leader (and the campaign he led), and those could very well resurface next winter in Calgary.
ARI concluded its survey with a blunt question: Should Poilievre remain leader or be replaced?
Here was the actual wording: “The Conservative Party of Canada is set to hold a national convention in January 2026, which will include a vote on the future of leader Piere Poilievre. If it were up to you, do you believe Poilievre should… 1) Lead the party into the next election, or 2) Be voted out, a new leader should be elected.”
Among all respondents, 64 percent believe Poilievre should remain the CPC leader going forward and into the next campaign, against 22 percent who agreed that Poilievre should be voted out by the membership (or otherwise). That is a nearly three to one ratio in favour of Poilievre staying put, which looks favourable at first glance for the Conservative leader.
When we look under the hood, ARI measured that majorities in all provinces (yes, even Quebec), across all age groups, and among both men and women want Poilievre to stay on. Which, for a leader whose personal favourability numbers are lukewarm at best, may appear contradictory.
However, breaking down the results by 2025 vote, ARI finds that majorities of Liberal (65 percent) and Bloc Québécois voters (76 percent), as well as nearly half of New Democrats (47 percent), say Poilievre should be voted out by the CPC membership in January. Although these are large proportions, they are not overwhelming either. They indicate that a quarter of Liberals and Bloquistes want Poilievre to stay on, as do nearly two in five new Democrats.
Most dislike him, yet many still want him to stay on. Why would that be, except if you believe that Poilievre has become a liability for the Conservatives, and that the CPC could be vulnerable if it kept him for another campaign?
More interesting, however, is what Conservative voters think. ARI finds that while most CPC voters wish for Poilievre to remain leader into the next campaign, only 68 percent of 2025 CPC voters believe he should stay. Nearly one in six (18 percent) say the party should choose a new leader after the 2026 convention. What are we to make of this?
That 68 percent figure is puzzling, because it sits in an ambiguous middle ground where it becomes a Rorschach test: If you side with Poilievre, of course 68 percent should be high enough; if you want Poilievre gone by the next campaign, 68 percent is “only” two-thirds, hence not nearly enough.
Had that figure been 90 percent, there would most likely be a consensus that Poilievre is on solid ground among the base, and that he isn’t going anywhere anytime soon (unless he himself calls it quits, which doesn’t appear likely). Had that number been 50 percent or so, political analysts of all stripes would likely conclude that Poilievre is cooked, that a leader cannot possibly hope to stay on after such a painful defeat when only half of his base stands by him. But 68 percent? Mushy middle. It could go either way.
Which is why the next political session will be so crucial for Poilievre.
Every move this fall—in the Commons, in public messaging, even on social media—will be scrutinized as if part of an updated resumé to be submitted in Calgary. Party polling numbers will serve as a running assessment of his ability to take down the Carney Liberals next time around.
The CPC Convention may be the final exam, but every chapter between now and then will count as a performance review. This fall in Ottawa, welcome to Pierre Poilievre’s job interview.
The post Pierre Poilievre’s Toughest Audience Yet: His Own Party first appeared on The Walrus.
